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THE USE AND LIMITS OF MARTIN-QUINN SCORES 
TO ASSESS SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, WITH 
SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEM OF 
IDEOLOGICAL DRIFT 
Ward Farnsworth∗
In their new paper, Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Segal, Andrew Martin, and 
Kevin Quinn investigate changes in behavior by Supreme Court Justices.1  
They conclude that the policy preferences of most Justices change during 
their careers, and suggest that this should cause Presidents to reconsider the 
use of nominations to try to change the direction of the Court.2  I find the 
authors’ evidence and analysis interesting, but am not yet convinced that 
any rethinking is in order by the people who pick Justices or care about 
their selection.  I will begin with a general discussion of the model—the 
Martin-Quinn scores—that the authors use to generate their findings.  It is 
an ingenious method that is attracting some wider interest,3 but its basis and 
workings have not yet been presented in a non-technical fashion that is 
likely to be understood well by a legal audience.  One goal of this Essay is 
to explain it in lay terms.  Then I will consider the particular claims the au-
thors make and, finally, their more general thesis about the predictability of 
behavior by Supreme Court Justices.  My two conclusions, in short, are that 
the authors have not proven that consequential surprises in the Justices’ be-
havior are more common than has been generally supposed; and that the au-
thors’ advice to Presidents (and others interested in the selection of Justices) 
is premature, because the behavior of some Justices is more predictable than 
that of others, and this itself can often be predicted by asking how firmly 
the Justices demonstrated their views before joining the Court. 
I.  
The authors claim to show that the policy preferences of most Supreme 
Court Justices change while they are on the Court.  The force and impor-
 ∗  Professor and Nancy Barton Scholar, Boston University School of Law.  Many thanks to Andrew 
Martin and Kevin Quinn for discussing their work with me at some length, and to Quinn for comments 
on an earlier version of this paper; thanks as well to Andrew Kull for comments and discussion. 
1  Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices:  Who, When, and How Im-
portant?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (link). 
2  Id. (manuscript at 46, on file with the Colloquy). 
3  Id. (manuscript at n.85). 
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tance of this result depend, of course, on the strength of the method used to 
produce it.  Their article relies on what they call “Martin-Quinn” scores for 
the Justices, but where those scores come from and just what they mean are 
not explained; the reader is referred to other articles for discussion of those 
issues.4  Referring the reader elsewhere is perfectly all right in principle, of 
course, but in this case the explanations in those other articles turn out to be 
hard to follow—or at least hard for me to follow.  The fault no doubt is 
mine, as I am all thumbs with mathematics; then again, that fault is widely 
shared among the apparent audience for the authors’ new article:  lawyers 
and others arguing about who ought to be put onto the Supreme Court.  For 
them, a clearer account in words of how the authors reached their conclu-
sions is much needed.  Otherwise there is a risk that readers will ignore the 
authors’ findings because they don’t understand them, or accept the au-
thors’ conclusions on faith because the findings have emerged from a black 
box that is mysterious but looks impressive.  I mean no disrespect to the au-
thors or to their ability to explain themselves.  I just view it as a case where 
they speak a slightly different language than some members of their audi-
ence. 
In hopes of making the operation of the authors’ methods more trans-
parent to the non-mathematician, then, I read the prior work of Professors 
Martin and Quinn in which they present their methods; more importantly, 
they were then so kind, patient, and collegial as to let me to ask them many 
questions, for which I hereby record my thanks.  I will now explain my un-
derstanding of their method as plainly as I can.  I apologize in advance to 
anyone who finds that I am belaboring the obvious, and to Martin and 
Quinn for any inaccuracies I commit in the course of simplifying and ex-
plaining their approach. 
The Martin-Quinn method keeps track of only one thing:  whether a 
Justice voted to affirm or reverse in a case.5  The method does not pay at-
tention to what the case was about; the method itself has nothing to do with 
politics or ideology (or, for that matter, law).  All it knows are things like 
this:  in the first case decided last year, Justices A, B, C, and D voted to af-
firm and Justices E, F, G, H, and I voted to reverse.  In the second case last 
year, Justice A voted to affirm and all the others voted to reverse.  And so 
forth for every case fed into the model, nothing more.  The authors’ find-
ings are all derived from analysis of that data.6
The model studies all the cases it is fed—all the patterns of voting, all 
the coalitions in the cases as just described—and then assigns a number to 
 
4  Id.  The references to which Epstein et al. refer the readers are Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. 
Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 
1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002) (link) and Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on 
the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005). 
5  See Martin & Quinn, supra note 4, at 137; Martin et al., supra note 4, at 1297 & n.75. 
6  Epstein et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 20–21). 
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each Justice.  You can plug those numbers into a formula and ask the for-
mula to generate the votes you would expect the numbers to produce.  Es-
sentially you say to the formula:  “Assume that every case the Court hears 
presents a choice between the same two poles (putting aside the question of 
what those poles are); and assume that these numbers reflect each Justice’s 
tendency to vote either way—their preferences between the poles.  Now 
imagine that they all vote on lots of cases, and show me what sorts of vot-
ing patterns and coalitions you would expect to emerge from the collisions 
of those numbers.”  The formula then generates a bunch of patterns.  If the 
numbers for each Justice are well-chosen, those patterns produced by the 
formula will look like the voting patterns we see in real life.  The formula 
will predict, based on the numbers it was given for each Justice, that there 
will be a certain number of cases where these five Justices will vote one 
way and those four Justices will vote another; a certain number where this 
one Justice votes alone and the other eight vote the other way; and so on.  
We can, of course, compare the patterns produced by the formula to the ac-
tual patterns of voting in any given time period; and if we do, we find (or at 
any rate the authors report) that their numbers are about 75% accurate.  In 
other words, over a large run of cases, the scores they give to each Justice 
can be used to generate voting patterns that match the real patterns about 
75% to 80% of the time.7  Notice that none of this so far need have any-
thing to do with the Justices’ policy preferences.  Nor can it be tested by (or 
used to make) predictions about the outcomes of individual cases. 
So we have a set of numbers for the Justices:  numbers that do the best 
possible job, when put into a formula, of generating the patterns of coalition 
that the Justices produce when they decide cases.  If you arrange the num-
bers in a line, you find that Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia (who vote 
together a lot) are toward one end of the line, and that Stephen Breyer and 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg (who also vote together a lot, but don’t vote often 
with Scalia and Thomas) are toward the other end of the line.8  Martin and 
Quinn (and then, in this most recent paper, their co-authors) then go another 
step:  they assume that every case before the Court presents a choice be-
tween a liberal vote and a conservative vote and that every Justice votes ac-
cording to his preference for liberal or conservative outcomes.  They then 
assume that the numbers produced by their system match those political 
preferences.  So whatever number Justice Scalia gets in their system not 
only is the best number for helping to produce accurate simulations of the 
Court’s voting patterns, but also is a statement of his preference for conser-
vative outcomes.  That number is called his ideal point:  a number that 
shows where, on a political scale, a Justice would like policy to be made.9
 
7  See Martin & Quinn, supra note 4, at 150. 
8  See Epstein et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 22, 25, 29) (figs. 5 (Ginsburg), 7 (Scalia), 12 
(Breyer and Thomas), respectively); see also Martin & Quinn, supra note 4, at 146 (table 1). 
9  See Epstein et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 20). 
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Ideal points have been devised by various researchers using different 
methods.10  Most of the methods involve looking directly at evidence 
thought to reveal a Justice’s preferences, as by examining votes in various 
kinds of cases.  A novelty of Martin and Quinn’s approach is that it tries to 
generate ideological ideal points—a measure of where a Justice falls on the 
ideological spectrum—without ever looking at ideology at all.  This is a 
strength of their method because it avoids certain kinds of circularity that 
can arise from other methods;11 it also may be a liability for reasons dis-
cussed later.12  For now just observe that the authors’ interpretation of the 
formula’s results—their reading of it as an array of policy preferences—is 
not a product of the formula.  It is an assumption by the people who made 
the formula.  By itself the formula does not prove the assumption is true, or 
suggest that it is true, or comment on its truth.  The formula just produces 
numbers—numbers that produce somewhat accurate pictures of how the 
Justices arrange themselves when they vote.  True, the formula’s accuracy 
shows that each Justice predictably votes with certain colleagues and not 
others; but everyone already knows that, and there are various ways to ex-
plain it besides the “attitudinal” way—the assumption that it’s all politics.  
For all the model shows, the Justices could have similar politics but differ-
ent views about interpretation or other such differences.  It also is true that 
the array of Justices produced by the model resembles—not always pre-
cisely, but noticeably—the array you would get if you tried to arrange the 
Justices according to conventional impressions of their politics or other 
measures of their ideal points.13  But that doesn’t necessarily mean that the 
model is measuring the politics of the Justices or that it isn’t measuring 
other things.  The positions of the Justices on the spectrum the authors pre-
sent—and the poles at either end of that spectrum—could reflect combina-
tions of policy preferences, interpretive approaches, judicial philosophies, 
and perhaps other qualities.  My own view, expressed elsewhere and like-
wise based partly on statistical analysis,14 is that ideology does play a major 
role in the decisions of cases; but for now I just want to clarify what the 
formulas used by the authors can and can’t establish.  The attitudinal view 
 
10  See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND 
REVISITED:  PSYCHOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT IDEOLOGY (1974). 
11  See Martin et al., supra note 4, at 1307. 
12  See discussion infra at Sec. II. 
13  See Martin & Quinn, supra note 4, at 145 (noting the “prima facie sensible” plausibility of the 
sorting produced by their model:  Marshall, Brennan, and Warren to one side; and Burger, Rehnquist, 
and Scalia to the other); id. at 146 (comparing results with other measures of conservative and liberal 
voting). 
14  See Ward Farnsworth, Signatures of Ideology:  The Case of the Supreme Court’s Criminal 
Docket, 104 MICH. L. REV. 67 (2005) (link); see also Ward Farnsworth, The Role of Law in Close 
Cases:  Some Evidence from the Federal Courts of Appeals, 86 B. U. L. REV. 1083 (2007). 
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is something the authors assume when they use their model, not something 
they prove with it. 
I have tried to clarify what the authors’ model knows and doesn’t 
know, and what it therefore shows and doesn’t show.  At a couple of points 
I have stressed the negative side of these points only because that is where I 
think the greatest danger lies:  it is easy to be confused into thinking the 
model proves things that it does not.  It is especially easy in this paper be-
cause the authors point to their model and then announce their conclusions 
without always being clear about what contributions are made by the as-
sumptions behind the model and their own assumptions about the meaning 
of the numbers the model produces.  I do not blame them for the lack of 
precision; they probably thought it wasn’t needed because they were count-
ing on their readers to already understand the model and its limits.  I just 
think that assumption is less safe than they do.  As some evidence for my 
view, Linda Greenhouse writes in her comment that “Epstein and her col-
leagues prove conclusively that preference change, at least among long-
serving Justices, is the rule rather than the exception.”15  But that isn’t what 
Epstein and her colleagues prove.  They prove—or anyway their evidence 
suggests—that behavioral change of some sort is the rule rather than the 
exception.  The idea that this happens because the Justices’ preferences 
change is their supposition, not what they prove; the apparatus they use in 
this project is incapable of proving it.  This distinction isn’t crucial for at 
least one version of their thesis, which just involves change by Justices; for 
if judicial behavior does change, then whether this results from changed 
preferences or from changes in anything else does not affect the bottom 
line:  their behavior does change.  But Ms. Greenhouse’s account reinforces 
my worries about the need for clarity, and helps explain why I am going to 
some pains to explain the authors’ model to the extent that I can. 
In any event, to compensate for this emphasis so far on the limitations 
of the model, let me now pause to congratulate Professors Martin and 
Quinn on their achievement.  It is an impressive thing—original, elegant, 
and praiseworthy—to explain a large share of the Justices’ voting patterns 
as outcomes of their arrangement along a single spectrum, whatever the 
spectrum may mean.  I have doubts about whether the authors prove as 
much as they think they have in this new paper, but those doubts do not at 
all stop me from greatly admiring the ingenuity and promise of their model. 
II.  
We now can turn to implications for the project at hand:  figuring out 
how much Justices change while they are on the Court.  Epstein et al. find 
that the ideal points they generate for most Justices—the numbers, in other 
 
15  Linda Greenhouse, Justices Who Change:  A Response to Epstein et al., 101 NW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2007), 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 132, 133 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu 
/lawreview/colloquy/2007/9/ (link) (citations infra refer to the Colloquy). 
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words, that, when entered into the formulas, best account for the patterns 
into which they form themselves when they vote—don’t stay the same over 
the years.  This leads the authors to state a finding and an implication.  The 
finding is that most Justices drift ideologically:  their preferences change.  
The implication, as I understand it, is that Presidents have less ability than 
previously thought to affect the Court in the long run.  Let me offer some 
reservations about these claims, starting with the finding that preferences 
change.   
First, Epstein et al. assume, as we have seen, (a) that every case before 
the Court presents a simple choice between a conservative and liberal out-
come, and (b) that the Justices vote according to their preferences for those 
two sorts of outcomes.  As we have seen, the Martin-Quinn model itself 
doesn’t assume that; the model just assumes that the Justices’ behavior can 
be plotted along one dimension, and the one dimension could be anything, 
or some package of things.  But when they put the model to use in this pro-
ject, they assume the poles of the spectrum, and the stakes of every case, are 
liberalism and conservatism.  Of course the authors know that the world 
isn’t quite that simple, but they evidently believe that any complexities be-
yond that picture aren’t important enough to affect their conclusions.  They 
might be wrong.  For present purposes I will put aside the point discussed a 
moment ago—that the model the authors use might measure things besides 
preferences, and that maybe those other things are changing instead.  As al-
ready noted, while that may be true, it wouldn’t affect the authors’ basic 
claim about the risk that Justices do change (it just questions what about 
them is changing).  But I do wish to raise a few other problems. 
I will start with two concerns of uncertain magnitude.  The first is that 
if the Justices’ preferences are more complicated than just liberal vs. con-
servative, their behavior might change without changes in their preferences 
or changes in anything else about themselves.  Their behavior might instead 
change because the cases change and the Justices don’t all view the politics 
at stake in them in the same way.  Suppose, to take a simplified example, 
that Justice Kennedy tends to vote for the government in cases involving 
criminal procedure, but against the government in cases involving free 
speech, while Justice Rehnquist—a less libertarian sort of conservative—
tends to vote for the government in both situations.  (Both assumptions 
happen to be accurate.)  Imagine that in term T, there are many criminal 
procedure cases (where the two Justices vote the same way) and few speech 
cases (where they don’t).  Then in term T + 1, there are lots of free speech 
cases.  Kennedy’s preferences may appear to drift to the left relative to 
Rehnquist’s when they haven’t really changed at all. 
The authors try to account for this by not just measuring each Justice’s 
ideal point term-by-term; for any given term, rather, they also take into ac-
count the Justice’s behavior in other terms, with decreasing weight as the 
other terms get farther away.  But whether this successfully erases the ef-
fects of the complexity just described is unknown and may be unknowable; 
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for the extent of the complexity itself is not known.  Even if all that the Jus-
tices care about is making policy (which is bound to be an overstatement), 
the content of those policy preferences probably is complicated—somewhat 
different from one area of law to the next, and different in the way each Jus-
tice thinks it applies to given cases within an area.  If those differences are 
significant, they foul up the authors’ model to an unknown degree; they 
may produce an impression that preferences are moving around when other 
things are moving around. 
A second worry is that a Justice might appear to change because the 
people around him have changed; a Justice who stands still while the rest of 
the court moves to the right (either because some of his colleagues drift or, 
more probably, because they are replaced) may end up with a different ideal 
point and an appearance of having changed even if he hasn’t.  Again, the 
authors make an effort to compensate for this by assuming that inertia bears 
on each Justice.  When a new Justice is added to the Court and differs from 
his predecessor, for example, voting patterns obviously may change as a re-
sult.  The authors react by setting their formulas to assume that Justices 
generally stay the same and find the way to account for the new patterns 
that is least disruptive to that assumption:  the formula blames the changes 
on the newcomer.  But if a Justice goes from usually being in the majority 
to usually being in the minority, it seems to me that this can’t help but even-
tually affect the ideal point that the formulas generate for him.  It will 
change his relative position among his colleagues; the changes by others 
may also affect the cases the Court decides to hear, which in turn can have 
feedback effects of the kind discussed a moment ago (the changed diet of 
cases may produce different voting behavior without a change in prefer-
ences).  Or the rest of the Court may move when replacements arrive, while 
the views of a sitting Justice also are changing at the same time (John Paul 
Stevens may be a good example of this),16 thus making it hard for the model 
to detect the influence of each force.   
I raise the worries in the last two paragraphs with diffidence because I 
am not competent to assess the authors’ equations and to address the degree 
of the distortion that could be caused by them.  In my discussions with Pro-
fessor Quinn, however, he has acknowledged that they are real risks.  He 
doubts that they are serious in practice; he particularly thinks my example 
involving Kennedy and Rehnquist is unlikely to be a problem, because the 
ideal points of the Justices will be based on lots of cases where they don’t 
vote together. In any event, the precise limits of the Martin-Quinn model—
the conditions under which the model, or the authors’ interpretation of it, 
has the potential to fail or mislead because the assumptions made by the 
model or its users turn out to be too strong—have not yet been carefully and 
clearly explained.  Perhaps the isolation of these risks and a more exact 
 
16  See Ward Farnsworth, Realism, Pragmatism, and John Paul Stevens, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE:  
UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 157, 157–58 (Earl M. Maltz, ed., 2003). 
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statement of their size and nature can be the subject of future work by the 
authors.  Until that work is done, I think their readers are entitled—and 
probably are prudently advised—to show some circumspection before bas-
ing practical decisions on the authors’ claims.  This caveat can be disre-
garded, of course, by readers able to derive precise answers to these 
questions for themselves based on the authors’ published equations.  I sus-
pect that such people are few in number, particularly among readers of law 
journals, but that is merely a guess.  I certainly encourage anyone interested 
to give it a try. 
Meanwhile, a clearer worry about the authors’ model involves meas-
urement of the magnitude of a Justice’s change.  There is an important dif-
ference between a statistically significant change in a Justice’s position 
within the authors’ model and a change in a Justice’s behavior that is likely 
to be significant to the people who supported and opposed his nomination.  
A first reason is that the model used in the authors’ paper treats every case 
as equally important, but real people don’t view the Court’s work that way.  
This discrepancy may have important practical consequences.  It means that 
a Justice can appear to move on the Martin-Quinn scale by, for example, 
starting to vote for the government somewhat more or less often in an area 
that isn’t of much general public interest (a distinct possibility; a substantial 
majority of the Court’s work is of little general public interest).  But that 
doesn’t mean the Justice moved in a sense that would have been important 
to those considering his appointment in the first place.  So if, as the authors 
claim, Justice Rehnquist moved to the left during his career, few of those 
who supported him—and, for that matter, few who opposed him—will care 
very much.  They know he mostly held the line on the fronts that were of 
greatest importance to them.  The authors’ model nevertheless makes 
Rehnquist look like a case study in change.  In one sense the model may be 
right:  perhaps he did change, even if in ways that most people didn’t per-
ceive, and this may be of interest to academic students of the Court.  But in 
another sense the model is wrong:  he didn’t change in ways that, if fore-
seen, would likely have had an effect on anyone’s view of his initial ap-
pointment.17  A problem with the authors’ argument is that it moves from a 
possible demonstration of change in the first sense to claims about change 
in the second sense; it says that since Justices change in ways their model 
detects, Presidents and others should change the way they think about 
whether their expectations will be fulfilled by Supreme Court nominees.  
This doesn’t follow, because significance within the authors’ model is not 
the same as significance to their intended audience. 
Further examples of the same point can be found by considering Jus-
tices who become more of whatever they were expected to be—the possible 
 
17  For an overview of Rehnquist’s appointment and performance, see Keith E. Whittington, William 
H. Rehnquist:  Nixon’s Strict Constructionist, Reagan’s Chief Justice, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE, supra 
note 16, at 8. 
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movement of Justice Scalia to the right, for example, or of Justice Ginsburg 
to the left.  Nobody much cares, as the authors more or less acknowledge;18 
to be more precise, the movements those Justices have undergone would (if 
foreseen) probably not have had much effect on anyone’s opinion at the 
time they were nominated.  Then there is Chief Justice Burger, whom the 
authors cite as yet another study in changed preferences.  They say he went 
from having quite conservative preferences to having slightly less conserva-
tive preferences—and then back to having quite conservative preferences 
again.19  It is not impossible that Warren Burger’s policy preferences did 
perform a back-and-forth odyssey of this sort, though I find myself attracted 
to other explanations for movement in his voting patterns (such as the ones 
already sketched).  In any event, though, even if his preferences did move 
around in this strange way, it is hard to imagine that anyone’s view of his 
appointment would have been changed by foreknowledge of it.  When you 
remove from the authors’ results all the changes in judicial behavior that 
were of little consequence in the senses just described, the findings they an-
nounce in their paper become less striking.  Most of the changers who re-
main are already well-known to have changed in ways that mattered. 
Second, the relationship between the spectrum generated by the au-
thors’ model and the spectrum of policy decisions in the real world is a mat-
ter of guesswork.  There is no inherent relationship between them.  Here, in 
effect, is the sequence:  the Justices are placed on a scale for the purpose of 
generating predictions about their voting patterns and the coalitions they 
will form.  Then along comes an analyst who notices that the scale puts Jus-
tices usually thought to be conservatives at one end and liberals at the other; 
he suggests that we therefore treat this as a liberal-conservative scale of 
their policy preferences.  Maybe that jump is fair and maybe it isn’t, as dis-
cussed earlier—but assume that it is.  Still, while it’s then possible to say 
what a statistically significantly change looks like with respect to the Jus-
tices’ voting behavior (the coalitions they form, etc.), it isn’t possible to 
convert that reasoning into a statement about when changes of that kind 
turn into policy differences of a significant size.  In other words, there is no 
mathematical or otherwise scientific way to take the changes the authors are 
measuring and say how large they are in familiar political terms or how 
much they are likely to matter to anyone. 
The authors perceive these problems, I think; they address them by 
choosing their language carefully.  In their conclusion, for example, they 
say this of ideological drift:  “In some instances, the movement may be 
relatively inconsequential, but in others substantial doctrinal change may 
result.”20  Well, yes, of course; and for practical purposes everything de-
 
18  See Epstein et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 35) (“[T]o be sure, some Presidents would not have 
objected to the drift exhibited by their Justices.  Scalia is a prime example.”). 
19  Id. (manuscript at 28–29). 
20  Id. (manuscript at 46). 
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pends precisely on whether and how often the changes are consequential, 
which the authors aren’t in a position to say because their model isn’t built 
to address that point.  It can address the general likelihood that a given Jus-
tice at a given time will cast tiebreaking votes,21 but that’s a different issue.  
I’m using a definition of consequential that might sometimes overlap with 
that one but is distinct:  whether the surprises in a Justice’s behavior would 
have materially affected anyone’s position on his nomination if they had 
seen them coming.  I select that definition and adhere to it because it is the 
pertinent one for purposes of the authors’ main payoff:  a set of points for 
political actors to consider ex ante when thinking about who should be put 
on the Supreme Court and estimating their likelihood of ideological disap-
pointment. 
III.  
Last, I want to step back and take a more general view of the authors’ 
project, their thesis, and their advice to Presidents and others in the business 
of picking Justices.  Here I meet a difficulty arising not from the authors’ 
model but from their rhetorical approach.  They initially create the impres-
sion (at least they did for me) that they will be challenging a “strong con-
sensus”22 about the stability of the Justices’ preferences, and advancing a 
claim “contrary to the received wisdom.”23  But when they state what might 
be considered a clear thesis, it is, for better or worse, very mild: 
[T]hose believing that they can entrench their views in the Court for the dec-
ades to come are occasionally mistaken. . . .  In turn, because these political ac-
tors cannot always accurately predict the future, our results may counsel 
against ideological appointments—at the least, ideological appointments to the 
neglect of other factors, especially a nominee’s qualifications and his or her 
ability to advance electoral goals.24
The hedge words in these claims—“occasionally,” “cannot always,” 
“may counsel,” “at the least,” “to the neglect”—shield them from objection 
but also drain them of novelty.  I don’t know of anyone who would have 
started reading the article with a view contrary to the one just excerpted; I 
would have described it as the received wisdom.  This need not be a criti-
cism.  Confirming received wisdom can be important, though I do not think 
that is what the authors believe they are doing—and perhaps elsewhere it 
isn’t.  But fussing about how novel a claim the authors made, or meant to 
make, is of no great interest, so let me instead offer a slightly broader view 
of the current situation and then consider what light the authors’ findings 
shed on it. 
 
21  See Martin et al., supra note 4, at 1304–1307. 
22  Epstein et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 10). 
23  Id. (manuscript at 1). 
24  Id. (manuscript at 36) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). 
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Everyone knows that some Justices change significantly during their 
careers and that this can cause important changes in the law.  The important 
questions involve (a) how often this happens, (b) whether it can be pre-
dicted, and (c) how Presidents should deal with the risk of it.  I have ex-
plained my difficulties with the authors’ claims about issue (a):  their model 
is good at showing that judicial behavior changes rather than stays still, but 
it is not as good at showing whether or how often those changes would have 
been considered important by those considering the appointment in the first 
place.  But a different problem appears when they then offer advice to 
Presidents or others thinking about the selection of Justices.  They skip 
from (a) to (c) without considering (b); yet (b) is crucial to (c).  In other 
words, how Presidents think about the possibility of putting an ideological 
stamp on the Court depends not just on how predictable Justices are gener-
ally, but also on how well their unpredictability can be predicted. 
The authors speak as though predictability were monolithic:  either the 
behavior of Justices can be predicted or it can’t be.  They don’t pay enough 
attention to whether Justices might differ in how predictable they will be.  
My own view is that they obviously do differ in that way.  If a Republican 
President wants to pick a Justice who will provide many long years of ideo-
logical satisfaction, he picks someone who has earned his ideological spurs 
by doing time in the federal executive branch while it was under control of 
the Republican party.  That sort of nominee has shown ideological com-
mitment in one of the so-called political branches, and the time spent in 
Washington will have given him plenty of chances to be scrutinized for re-
liability by other people with those same ideological commitments.  
Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito all fit this mold.  The first 
three have not changed in consequential ways (though as we have seen, two 
of them are counted as studies in change by Epstein et al.).  The latter two 
probably won’t go through consequential changes, either, though their be-
havior, too, may slide around enough to move the needle on the authors’ 
seismograph. 
A President who can’t get an ideologically reliable nominee through 
the confirmation process because he is politically weak, or who has other 
priorities, may resort to outsiders who haven’t demonstrated their ideology 
in the same way:  someone like Stevens, Blackmun, O’Connor, Kennedy, or 
Souter, all of whom have been ideological disappointments to many of their 
original supporters.  That is simply a cost of departing from the path of 
choosing someone with a more clearly proven ideology.  Sometimes Presi-
dents choose to incur those costs because they care more about other things; 
sometimes they have those costs forced upon them by circumstance. 
Needless to say, there are no guarantees provided by nominees of ei-
ther of these types.  Anyone can change, and perhaps it’s even likely that 
everyone will change over the course of an adult lifetime in ways detectable 
by statistical scrutiny.  But these two types of nominees carry with them 
very different probabilities of actual disappointment to those who choose 
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and support them.  I think this point has been well-understood for a long 
time by people involved in the nomination process, and now Professor Dorf 
has demonstrated it more carefully and at some length.25  I do not know 
whether it has always been true or always will be; possibly a different story 
could be told about the predictability of Justices at earlier points in the 
country’s history or at early points in the authors’ study set, which goes 
back to 1937.  But political sociology changes just as people do, so trying to 
get traction on these questions today—perhaps to advise a current Presi-
dent—based on the calculations that worked or didn’t work in the 1940s 
seems unlikely to be very fruitful. 
What the new article from Epstein et al. adds is the knowledge that, to 
a degree of practical importance that is uncertain, the typical Supreme Court 
Justice won’t behave identically throughout a full career.  That’s interesting 
to me as an academic student of the Court; it makes their paper a valuable 
contribution.  The difficulty arises because the authors want to do more than 
make this contribution; they want to give advice.  If I were advising a 
President, however, I would tell him not to let these findings distract him 
from the points sketched a moment ago.  For that is my greatest concern 
about the authors’ work:  that some officials or members of the public 
might be unduly distracted by the claims of Epstein et al., or perhaps by a 
misreading of them.  For despite the hedge words I mentioned a moment 
ago, it would be easy to take away from their article a conclusion that it is 
generally hard to predict what any Justice will think and do ten or fifteen 
years after appointment.  Indeed, an excellent strategy for a Machiavellian 
right-winger (or, mutatis mutandis, a Machiavellian left-winger) would be 
to interpret the article as I just suggested, praise it to the skies, and do what-
ever can be done to get it discussed in The New York Times.  This could 
have two good consequences for the hypothetical conservative we are imag-
ining.  It might cause Democrats to take less interest in the ideologies of 
nominees they themselves put forward, and it might cause Democrats to 
worry less about the ideologies of the nominees that Republicans put for-
ward.  Then next year, if Michael Luttig is nominated to the Supreme 
Court, our Machiavellian friend can point to the famous findings of Epstein 
et al. to reassure everyone on the left that they should relax:  you really 
can’t predict with much confidence what a Justice will be like ten years af-
ter appointment.  As the authors have shown, “virtually every” Justice 
changes during his career;26 there’s every chance that Mike Luttig will, too.  
(Snicker.) 
 
25  Michael C. Dorf, Does Federal Executive Branch Experience Explain Why Some Republican Su-
preme Court Justices ‘Evolve’ and Others Don’t?, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming Spring 
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=935129 (link). 
26  See Epstein et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 4). 
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